INTRODUCTION
This work deals with a first-price sealed-bid auction of a single item. Such type of auction, as well as many other types, have been extensively used as selling mechanism and have been the subject of an intensive theoretical research in economics and operations research.
1 Much of this research has focused on the equilibrium analysis of the corresponding oneshot Bayesian game. 2 Other research efforts have been devoted to auction design, based on equilibrium analysis. 3 This work differs from previous ones in three main aspects: (a) it discusses discrete models, (b) it deals with repeated auctions with incomplete information, 4 and in particular, (c) it does not analyze the repeated-game equilibria set, but rather employs`l earning theory. ' ' More precisely, we analyze the path generated by players who use various classes of belief-based learning schemes, including the class of learning schemes with bounded recall and the class of generalized fictitious play learning schemes. Roughly speaking, a player with a recall of size m assigns a positive probability to a vector of the other players' bids if and only if this vector was used in one of the last m stages. A player that uses a generalized fictitious play learning scheme assumes that his opponents' next bid vector is distributed according to a weighted empirical distribution of their past bid vectors. 5 We further assume that the players are risk neutral and that each player's type is determined before the first auction and does not vary with time. 6 In our main result (Theorem A in 66 HON-SNIR, MONDERER, AND SELA Section 5) we prove under mild assumptions concerning tie-breaking rules that after sufficiently long time the players play an equilibrium of the oneshot auction in which players' types are common knowledge. This result means, that generically, the player with the highest valuation wins the object and pays the second-highest valuation. That is, under our beliefbased learning assumption, a repeated first price auction yields in the longrun the outcome of a one-shot second-price auction. In Section 6 we show by examples that Theorem A does not hold when we remove one of the tiebreaking rules. However, we show that for two-person auctions, even without this tie-breaking rule, if both players use a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then the beliefs of the players approach a mixedaction equilibrium.This last result does not hold when the players use a learning scheme with bounded recall as is shown by an example. Section 7 is devoted to some other learning schemes that seem natural in the context of auctions, and in both Section 6 and Section 7 we provide some remarks and open problems. The proofs of the main theorems are given in Section 8.
REPEATED (DISCRETE) FIRST-PRICE SEALED-BID AUCTION
Let N=[1, 2, ..., n] be the set of players. In the one-shot auction A(v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n ), Player i has a type v i which is a positive integer. That is, v i is the expected monetary value of the item for Player i. The action set of each player is the set Z + =[1, 2, ...] of positive integers. When every player i # N makes a bid x i # Z + , the player with the maximal bid wins the object. If there is more than one such player, we deviate from the standard theory by purifying the game: Instead of assuming that in such a case the winner is determined by a lottery, we assume that every winner receives his expected utility. That is, if
, where w denotes the number of players j with x j =x max . Our purifying method is harmless if the players are assumed risk neutral, as we indeed assume. The types are selected by Nature according to the probability distribution * over (Z + ) N . Every player knows his type. The precise nature of * as well as the information channels of the players are not important for the``learning'' analysis (amthough they play a crucial role in the standard equilibrium analysis). In the repeated auction, Nature chooses the types v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , and the auction is repeatedly conducted. The repeated auction is denoted by RA(v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n ).
BELIEF-BASED LEARNING
Consider a repeated game in strategic form. The one-shot game is denoted by G. The set of players in G is N=[1, 2, ..., n]. The action set of Player i is S i , and i 's utility function is u i : S Ä R, where S=_ j # N S j and R denotes the set of real numbers.
7 Let H t =S t be the set of histories of length t. By convention, H 0 is a singleton. A strategy for player i is a function f i : t=0 H t Ä S i . For a finite set X, 2(X ) denotes the set of probability measures over X. A belief function for i is a function B i :
, where e i is a given positive integer, and S &i =_ j{i S j . B i (h t&1 ) is the belief of Player i about the t th joint action of all other players, after he observes the history h t&1 =(x 1 , ..., x t&1 ). Player i generates beliefs only after he observes at least e i action profiles. 8 Let BR i be the pure best response correspondence of Player i at the one-shot game. A learning scheme for i is a pair (
We deal with learning schemes that satisfy stronger conditions than those of Milgrom and Roberts [18] for an infinite history h=(x 1 , x 2 , ...), we denote (x 1 , ..., x t ) by h [t] .For two finite histories h=(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x t ) # H t and h$=(z 1 , z 2 , ..., z t$ ) # H t$ we denote by (h, h$) the history (x 1 , x 2 , ..., 
Condition AD1 means that Player i assigns a low probability to action profiles that have not been used for a long time. AD2 means that Player i assigns a 0-probability to a profile of actions that has never been used. Condition AD3 means that Player i does not ignore recent information.
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7 Actually we assume that G has been already chosen by Nature according to some probability measure *. Each Player has received his signal and therefore knows the set of players, the set of actions (S j ) j # N and its own utility function. The exact nature of * is not relevant, however it is implicitly assumed that i 's utility function which may depend on his signal, does not depend on the other players' signals. That is, the players can compute their best-response correspondences.
8 e i can be interpreted as the length of the experimenting period. The collection (e j ) j # N can be used to capture the concept of prior beliefs.
For a sequence (w t ) t=1 of real numbers and for a subset A of positive integers we denote
is a generalized fictitious play (GFP) learning scheme if there exists a nondecreasing sequence w=(w t ) t=1 of positive real numberssuch that for every t>e i and for every history h t&1 =(x 1 , ..., x t&1 ): 
and 
Lemma 3.1. Every learning scheme with bounded recall is adaptive.
Proof. Obviously, BR2 implies AD2 and AD3. It also implies a stronger version of AD1: For every =>0 and for every T>e i , we can take
We say that the recall size of a learning scheme with bounded recall is
1 is the minimal positive integer which satisfies BR1 and BR2. The following simple lemma gives a useful principle. The converse of principle has already been proved in other versions by Fudenberg and Kreps [4] , by Monderer and Sela [20] (who call it the``stability principle''), and by Fudenberg and Levine [5] .
Lemma 3.2. Consider a repeated game as described above. Let h= (x 1 , x 2 , ...) be a path that is generated when each player i uses either a learning scheme with bounded recall or a GFP learning scheme. Assume that there exists x # S and T 0 such that x t =x for every t T 0 . Then x is in equilibrium.
Proof. If Player i uses a learning scheme with bounded recall, then for a certain large t he uses x i as a best reply versus x &i . If i uses a GFP learning scheme, then for every =>0, i uses x i as a best reply to a belief which assigns to x &i a probability greater than 1&=. Therefore x i must be a best reply to x &i . K
Note that a belief function does not determine the learning scheme; If
2 ) are two learning schemes with the same belief function, then for
is not a singleton. It is sometimes convenient to add a tie-breaking rule to the definition of a learning scheme. We will frequently use the following such rule:
. Note that TB1 is only a partial tie-breaking rule. That is, there may be ties to which it is not applied.
BELIEF-BASED LEARNING IN AUCTIONS MAIN THEOREM
We proceed to analyze the paths generated by players in the repeated auction RA(v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n ), when each player uses a GFP learning scheme or a learning scheme with bounded recall. Note that for each Player i with v i >1, every bid x i v i is weakly dominated by the bid v i &1. We will assume the tie-breaking rule:
.., v n ) be a repeated first-price auction. Assume every player is using either a learning scheme with a bounded recall, or a GFP learning scheme, along with the tie-breaking rules TB1 and TB 2. Then there exist a time T 0 and a strategy profile x # S which is in equilibrium in the one-stage auction A(v 1 , v 2 ..., v n ), such that x t =x for every t>T 0 .
The proof of Theorem A follows from combining the methods of proof of the following two weaker versions of it, Propositions 1 and 2. These versions are needed for later references. In Proposition 1 we prove our convergence result under the assumption that every player is using a learning scheme with a bounded recall, and in Proposition 2 we prove the same result under the assumption that every player is using a GFP learning scheme.
.., v n ) be a repeated first-price auction. Assume every player is using a learning scheme with a bounded recall, along with the tie-breaking rules TB1 and TB 2. Then there exist a time T 0 and a strategy profile x # S which is in equilibrium in the one-stage auction
.., v n ) be a repeated first-price auction. Assume every player is using a GFP learning scheme, along with the tiebreaking rules TB1 and TB 2.Then there exist a time T 0 and a strategy profile x # S which is in equilibrium in the one-stage auction A(v 1 , v 2 ..., v n ), such that x t =x for every t>T 0 .
We end the section with a remark concerning a possible, seemingly shorter proof of Proposition 2.
A path (x 1 , x 2 , ...), in S is a better-reply path if for every t 1 for which x t is not in equilibrium, x t+1 {x t and for every i for which x i t+1 {x i t , Player i strongly prefers x i t+1 to x i t when he believes that the next move of all other players is x &i t . Monderer and Sela [20] proved that if all players use a GFP learning schemeand apply the tie breaking rule TB1, then eliminating all successive repetitions from the path generated by the players yields a better-reply path. They deduce that in a game that does not have better reply cycles, the path generated by players that use GFP learning schemes and apply the tie-breaking rule TB1, must stabilize on equilibrium. One may think that an auction with commonly known types has this noncycling property. This would have provided a very short proof of Proposition 2. The next example shows, however, that this is not the case. In this case, the path generated by the players does not stabilize. However, we show below that the corresponding belief path does stabilize.
For
be the sequenceof beliefs. This sequence is converging to ( p, q) # 2(S 1 )_ 2(S 2 ), where p(5)=1, q(4)= is an arbitrary integer in [1, 2] . Although the belief sequence generated by the path in (5.1) does not necessarily converge, it approaches equilibrium in the sense of Monderer and Shapley [21] : A sequence
is approaching equilibrium if for every =>0 there exists T 1, such that ( p t , q t ) is an =-equilibrium for every t T.
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Theorem
the tie-breaking rule TB 2. Thenthe belief sequence generated by the players is approaching equilibrium in the one-stage auction A(v 1 , v 2 ).
The proof of Theorem B is given in Section 8. In the next example we assume that both players use a FP learning schemewith bounded recall. It is shown that the pathof actions that is generated by the players does not stabilize and the belief sequence does not approach equilibrium. When we deal with n 3 players, any limit point of the belief sequence belongs to the set _i # N 2(S &i ), and therefore, it is meaningless to discuss approaching an equilibrium of the belief sequence. However, if every player is using a FP learning scheme, we can define p 
OTHER LEARNING SCHEMES
In this section we discuss belief-based learning schemes, which seem natural in the context of repeated auction, but which are not covered by Theorem A. The original definition of fictitious play was given for 2-person games. One possible generalization to more than 2 players is the one given in Section 5. One may consider another possible generalization as in Monderer and Shapley [21] . In this version, we say that Player i uses the individual fictitious play (IFP) learning scheme if he acts myopically and at every stage t he believes that each of his opponents makes an independent decision and that for every j{i, Player j 's next choice is distributed according to j 's empirical distribution up to stage t&1. One can similarly define generalized IFP learning schemes and individual learning schemes with bounded recall. Except for 2-person games when the FP and IFP learning schemes coincide, we do not know whether any of our convergence results holds for the IFP learning schemes.
Next, consider a learning scheme in which Player i believes that the next maximal bid will be the average of all previous maximal bids. 12 Since bids must be integers and the average maximal bid is not necessarily an integer, we slightly modify the model. If the average maximal bid of all other players is a, where l<a<l+1, l a positive integer, then Player i assigns probability l+1&a to l and a&l to l+1. We call such a learning scheme an average maximal bid (AMB) learning scheme. Hon-Snir [7] proved (for the discrete first-price auction discussed in this paper) that when all players use an AMB learning scheme and apply the tie breaking rules TB1 and TB2, then the generated path of action profiles stabilizes on equilibrium.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS: FUTURE RESEARCH
Domination. Hon-Snir [7] proved that the discrete first-price auction game discussed in this paper is weak dominance solvable in the sense of Moulin [23] . That is, it is solved by successive elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, in the sense that every strategy profile in the Cartesian product of the sets of strategies that survive the elimination process, is in equilibrium. It is tempting to make the conjecture that Theorem A remains true for such games. Technically, Theorem A assumes TB2 which has no meaning in general games. Consider, however, the game derived from the first-price auction game by eliminating for each player, all bids which are greater than or equal to his valuation. From Theorem A we can conclude that for every such quasi first-price auction game, if the players use one of the learning schemes discussed in this paper, along with TB1, then the path of actions eventually stabilizes on equilibrium. But as the following example shows, even Proposition 1 does not hold for general weak dominance solvable games. This game is weak dominance solvable and the elimination process leads to the outcome bb. Assume each player is using a learning scheme with a recall of size 1, along with the tie breaking rule TB1. If the initial move is aa, the path of actions generated by the players may follow the cycle aa, ca, cc, ac, aa.
Consider a game which is solvable by successive elimination of strongly dominated strategies. One can deduce from Milgrom and Roberts [18] , that if every player is using a GFP learning scheme with the tie-breaking rule TB1, then the path of action profiles generated by the players stabilizes on equilibrium. It is easy to show that this result holds also when each player is using either a learning scheme with bounded recall, or a GFP learning scheme. That is, Theorem A is valid for such games. Obviously a first-price auction game is not strong dominance solvable. One may expect some intermediate dominance solvability property in between strong and weak, which is satisfied by first-price auction games and implies Theorem A.
13 Such a natural property is the invariance under order of elimination. However, the game in Example 5 has this property. Rochet [26] characterized a subclass of games that satisfy this property. In these games, if one player is indifferent to two action profiles so are the other players. As noted by Marx and Swinkels [10] , discrete first-price auction games do not satisfy Rochet's condition. Nevertheless it is interesting to know that Rochet's condition does not imply our learning result, as is shown in the following example. 14 
75
A LEARNING APPROACH TO AUCTIONS 13 Moulin [23] proved that if a game is weak dominance solvable and in addition has the property that the (pure strategy) best response correspondences are singled valued, then if all players use a bounded recall learning scheme with a recall of size 1, the process stabilizes on equilibrium. We do not know whether the same result holds when the players have bigger recalls, though we conjecture it does not. However, first-price auction games do not satisfy Moulin's condition.
14 Marx and Swinkels [10] generalized Rochet's theorem by proving it under a weaker requirement which they call TDI (transference of decisionmaker indifference). As they noted, generically discrete first-price auction games satisfy TDI, but Example 6 shows TDI is not sufficient for our learning result. It is interesting to note that the first-price auction games discussed in this paper do not satisfy TDI.
Example 6. Consider the following two-person game in which Player 1 chooses a row, and Player 2 chooses a column. This game is weak dominance solvable and the elimination process leads to the outcome bc. Assume each player is using a learning scheme with a recall of size 1, along with the tie breaking rule TB1. If the initial move is aa, the path of actions generated by the players may follow the cycle aa, ba, bb, cb, cc, ac, aa.
To summarize, while dominance solvability seems to play a crucial role in Theorem A, it seems that first-price auction games have a special additional structure which is not easily identified and which forces convergence.
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Imperfect monitoring. In the models discussed in this paper we assumè`p erfect monitoring.'' That is, at every stage t, every player i knows the full history of bids up to time t&1, or at least he knows the full history of the last m i bids. In the context of auctions it is reasonable to assume that the players are informed only about the winning bids. It seems to us that analyzing repeated auctions when the players are using belief based learning schemes with such imperfect monitoring will contribute to auction theory.
Reinforcement learning. In the theory of reinforcement learning, 16 players do not form beliefs about the other players' next move. They are assumed to use a mixed action at each stage, where the probability assigned by this mixed action to a pure bid positively depends on the success of this bid in the past. The many ways in which these probabilities can be updated give rise to a variety of reinforcement strategies. It seems natural to analyze repeated auctions with reinforcement players.
Varying types. Consider a repeated auction in which the players' types vary stochastically with time. If the distribution of the random type vectors does not depend on time, then we actually deal with a repeated Bayesian game. If all the players are using learning schemes, then they generate a stochastic process in S. Hon-Snir [7] partially analyzed the stochastic path generated by fictitious players in a model where players' types are determined at each stage by the same i.i.d. random variables, each of them is uniformly distributed on [1, 2, ..., V ]. She shows that if the number of possible types for each player does not exceed seven (i.e., V 7), then with probability one, for a sufficiently late stage the players' behavior is in equilibrium in the one-stage Bayesian game in which the (common) distribution of each type is commonly known. She used computer simulation to analyze the model with more than seven possible types. It seems that the result continues to hold, although no analytical proof is given.
Removing the TB 2 assumption. We conjecture that all our theorems hold without the TB2 assumption, but it increases the size of the proofs significantly.
17 Since this is a natural assumption we do not actually prove this conjecture.
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem A. We first prove two propositions. These propositions are needed for later reference. The methods of proof of the propositions can be combined in an obvious manner to generate a proof of Theorem A.
.., v n ) be a repeated first-price auction. Assume every player is using a learning scheme with a bounded recall, along with the tie-breaking rules TB1 and TB 2. Then there exist a time T 0 and a strategy profile x # S which is in equilibrium in the one-stage auction A(v 1 , v 2 ..., v n ), such that x t =x for every t>T 0 .
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the recall size of Player i by m i . Assume without loss of generality that Nature chooses the types in a nonincreasing order. That is, v
n . The proposition obviously holds when v 2 =1. We therefore proceed to prove it under the assumption that v 2 >1. Let h=(x 1 , x 2 , ...) be the path generated by the players. We will need also the following notations: Let e=max j # N e j , let M i be the set of all players j for which v j =v i , and let 
where |M | denotes the number of players in M. Note that in the nonpurified model q
is the probability of winning if the maximal bid of all other players is b and j 's bid is also b. Therefore, if j bids b at stage t, then according to his belief, his expected utility is
Note further that
We need the following claim. 
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This is obvious if v 2 <4, thus we proceed to prove it, assuming that v 2 4. We prove by induction on 1 k v 2 &3 that there exists T k such that x j t k+1 for every j # M 1 and t>T k and that if M 1 is a singleton then y t (2) k+1 for each such t. Additional two claims are needed:
If at time t>e, Player j weakly prefers k to k+1, then
where the left-hand side of (8.2) equals zero when k=1.
Proof of Claim 2. As j weakly prefers k to k+1, E 
Hence, (8.2) is obtained by manipulating the right-hand side of the previous inequality. K
The proof of the next claim is obvious.
We now return to the main proof.
. We show that j does not bid 1 for t>e. Indeed, assume in negation that x j t =1 for such t. In particular, j weakly prefers 1 to 2 at t. Hence, by Claim 2, ). This is a contradiction because bidding v 2 &1 gives a higher expected payoff than bidding v 2 versus such a belief. Assume the assertion holds for k&1, 2 k v 2 &3, we now prove it for k with T k = T k&1 +2e.
Let j # M 1 . Assume j bids k at some t>T k . In particular j weakly prefers k to k+1. Therefore, by Claim 2, (8.2) holds. By the induction hypothesis the probability that the maximal bid of all other players is less or equal to k&1 equals zero, hence the left-hand side of (8.2) is zero and, therefore,
Since v j &k&2>0, this yields p and, hence, p 
